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## **PROSPECTS FOR DE GAULLE'S RETURN TO POWER**

It now appears inevitable that General De Gaulle will return to power, possibly in succession to the Queuille Government, but more probably in succession to a transition Cabinet favorable to De Gaulle. France is now approaching that condition of chaos which De Gaulle has long thought to be the necessary setting for his return. Although the Queuille Government will probably be able to stem the current strike wave, its inability to halt inflation after an initial tactical victory will bring on further labor unrest. Rising inflation, combined with the already heavy tax burden of the French propertied classes (including the peasantry and lower middle class) will cause that sizeable group to become more dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction, added to that of labor, will make the position of the Queuille Government increasingly shaky.

De Gaulle's Rally of the French People (RPF) is certain to win a tactical position in the Council of the Republic (the French second chamber) in the late October elections for the Council. The Communists will return only an isolated minority to this body; the increased representation of the Right and Center will be organized by the newly-elected RPF members into a majority favorable to De Gaulle. Although usually of secondary importance, the Council will be able, following the reconvention of the National Assembly in November, to reinforce public demand that the Assembly dissolve itself and prepare the way for new elections with direct pressure upon the Assembly.

Although the lengthy process of installing a new regime would delay De Gaulle's inevitable return, his assumption of power could be legally hastened in the event of a grave domestic or international crisis. In such a situation, the President of France could ask De Gaulle to form a Cabinet, or a coalition sympathetic to De Gaulle could form an interim government pending his return.

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In order to overcome a clumsy political and administrative mechanism, De Gaulle will probably be tempted, upon his return, to resort to dictatorial methods. The Communists will undoubtedly try to goad De Gaulle into taking extreme measures. However, the compromises which De Gaulle will have to make with political and labor leaders in order to insure their support, combined with the popular support he will then enjoy, will probably lead him to achieve his ends legally. De Gaulle's ability to retain popular support will probably enable him to achieve considerable success in relieving instability and defeatism in France. Although De Gaulle's intransigently nationalistic attitude will tend to make difficult his relations with the US and the nations of western Europe, this intransigence will be mitigated by his awareness of French dependence on the US for essential economic and military aid. De Gaulle's will to resist Soviet aggression, his desire for an effective western European union, and his determination to create a strong France capable of leadership will all further US security objectives in Europe.

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